In 1975 c e p a l subm itted a request to a distinguished U ruguayan intellectual, Car los Real de Azüa, for a study on the special econom ic and political develop m ent problem s th a t small nations have to face. The au th o r prepared a first draft in th a t same year, but, for various reasons, never com pleted th e final version. Now, w hen all who knew him are lam enting his untim ely death, we wish to pay him the m odest trib u te of publishing p art of his study in the form o f an article.
A nation, or more accurately a nationstate, is the ordinary scene of operation for a style of development, and this specification has serious and substantial implications. As a collection of miscella neous resources, as an area of conceiv able viability, the nation-State scenario may be one of the most commonsensical determinants o f the choice of a style; nevertheless, it would not be far wrong to infer that the selection of styles is decided by other motives and that the weighing-up of viability, conditions and resources is a task of estimation carried out a posteriori', with all the contingent adjustments and amendments that it may entail.
Be this as it may, nation-States and styles of development are two phenome na which up to now have been generated in completely diachronic fashion; the former came first and the latter very much later, although the gap between them may seem narrow in the case of the 'new nations'. Even today, however, Cobban's remark holds good: when a nation is seeking self-determination it does not do so on the basis of a balancesheet of positive and negative qualifica tions.1 At one stage of history or another, then, the national entity ap pears as the primary and inexorable de terminant of the bounds within which any system of growth or development activities must operate. The practical consensus existing on this point obviates the need to dwell on it further.2 Self- ' See Alfred Cobban, The N ation-State and N ational Self-D eterm inations, New York, Thom as and Crowell Co,, 1970, p. 137. 2Cf. Helio Jaguaribe, " Los m odelos p o li ticos y el desarrollo nacional en A m erica Lati na" , in A p o rte s, N° 6, Paris, O ctober 1967, pp. sufficient and independent, or hopelessly needy and dependent, the nation-State as a concrete reality counts for a great deal, and it is not a m atter of indif ference that in the second of these alternative cases -that of indigenceeven the most cogent external impera tives have to go through a process of authentication via a system of adoption of formally 'final' decisions, supposed to be implemented unilaterally within a given milieu.
Today, in reality, the nation-State, or the nation pure and simple, appears, in contrast to all the premonitions of its decadence -and also to all the emphasis placed on its invincible m ig h t-as a form of human and spatial organization whose characteristics can be defined by a series of highly contradictory epithets: in creasing in terms of number (about 50 new nations in the last few decades); tremendously durable and steadfast to withstand all potential aggressions on the part of powers in the ascendant; ines capable or indispensable in all kinds of promotion activities, although at the same time frail and insecure; conditioned by history; inadequate and inappropriate for a large number of functions and requirements;3 and perhaps destined, in [8] [9] Marshall Wolfe, " D evelopm ent: images, conceptions, criteria, agents, choices" ,  Vol. XVÏII, N 06. 1-2, 1973, p. 5; Marshall Wolfe, 3 It w ould have been hard to imagine, for example,, in the years when William T. Fox was the remote future, to give way to broader or more ambitious patterns of human and spatial organization. 4 But for practical purposes it would be unrealistic, or, above all, dangerous, to discount any nation as an absolute rather than as a relative concept: a na tion, as someone has noted, may be integrated as solidly as a private firm or so loosely that it is pointless (or, more exactly, almost pointless) to treat it as such.5 In any event, we believe it may usefully be examined 'as such' in one of its facets -t h a t of size-in relation to development and development styles, leaving for another possible occasion the much-canvassed topic of patterns of amalgamation or integration which will wipe out or offset its shortcomings.
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Among all the problems posed by the national entity with respect to devel opment programming and styles, that of size will be the sole -but very complexquestion to be tackled here. And assum ing that large national areas and popula tions do n ot constitute any obstacle to promotion policies, only one of the ex treme dimensional possibilities -sm all ness of size-will be discussed. theorizing about 'superpow ers' and Carl Schm itt ab o u t intern atio n al hierarchization (1939, 1944) , th at a third o f a cen tu ry later one of these powers was going to stand in such u rg en t need of the o th er's n atu ral gas, and the latter of the form er's interm ediate technology. Perhaps it is because " never before have national units so num erous and exhibiting such wide variations in size. . . participated as juridical equals. . . in a com m on world order" 6 that the attention attracted by the problem o f national size has been less sporadic and impres sionistic than that reflected in the h isto ry o f ideas on the subject which will be briefly recapitulated below . 'Sheer size1, says Apter, " is an obvious organizational factor that is often neglected" .'7 But in considering the 'national m easurem ents' which the size factor involves, the time factor cannot be left ou t o f account: each period o f history implies its own, and whereas in the nineteenth century they mattered alm ost exclusively in rela tion to financial resources, military d efence and political structures, today they are o f im portance first and fore m ost in terms o f industrialization possi bilities and market size. 
A glance a t h istory
There is really nothing system atic about the adoption o f the tw o points o f view in the rather meagre history o f the sub ject o f com m unity size. We use the generic term 'com m u nity' because in that history tw o stages have to be distin guished: the prenational and the nation al, with the peculiarity that many arguments and justifications conceived in the first were reiterated and applied in the second.
Plato, Aristóteles, Rousseau stated the problem primarily in terms o f cohe sion, consensus and possibilities o f selfgovernm ent; in the writings o f Aristó teles, however, almost all the arguments that held sway during that phase were articulated in synthesis.10 Thus, aware ness o f the political facilities represented by the strict confines o f the 'polis' (or the circum scription o f the canton, in Rousseau) was accom panied by percep tion o f the am ount o f resources that the area should contain if it were to achieve the much-desired 'autarky'; and insight was also gained into the domain o f 'pub lic order'. It was realized that interrela tionships existed betw een territorial measurements and the possibilities o f more m ethodical control over the popu lation. And if capacity for control is one o f the hallmarks o f any sound organiza tion, it must be added that A ristóteles conceived the possibility o f the national m odel as a type o f spatial organization in cases where dim ensions exceeded those thought to be fitting and reasonable for the traditional 'city o f antiquity'. 11
The greatest city-State is not the largest or the m ost populous, said Aristó teles. This assertion, together with others, draws attention to the Stagirite's ability to arrive at the concept o f mag nitude or entity as distinct from mere physical 'size': the criteria whereby the one was differentiated from the other were the qualities o f the inhabitants in terms o f worth, intelligence and willing ness to work hard, their level o f integra tion or -as Aristóteles puts i t -the efficien cy with which they perform the tasks incum bent on th em .12 When, tw o thousand years later, these conclusions were restated, it was from the primarily political angle o f 'dim ension' and 'régime' that they were considered. The possibility o f a republic was assigned by M ontesquieu to small com m unities, whereas he believed that those o f m edium size were more com pat ible w ith monarchy and very large on es with despotism . Rousseau, with regard to population size, maintained that the num ber o f ruling figures decreases in proportion to the increase in the popula tion, a ratio which as a proposition is perfectly correct provided it is assumed (we do not know o f any analyses o f the postulate) that there are fixed degrees o f centralization or monism (very logical
12 Ib id . It is also w orth while to p o in t o u t th a t he no ted the possibility of achievem ents w hich could offset disadvantages, in his rem ark th a t " the largest city is n o t the hap p iest" . Cf. sim ilar considerations elsewhere in his work.
from the point o f view o f Rousseau) and a given number o f decision-makers which remains the same, irrespective o f the size o f the territory in which these decisions have to be im plem ented.13
With the passage o f half a century the predominant markedly universalist illuminism and b elief in natural law gave ground, and the top ic o f national size and o f the advantages and drawbacks o f small dim ensions surged up again concurrently with the wave o f nationalist m ovem ents in the early and m id-nineteenth century. A lm ost always, however, the balancesheet o f advantages and disadvantages was presented w ithout reference to any specific tim e or place, a characteristic which was not avoided in a notably acute passage in T ocqueville's w ork '4 and only partly in the som ewhat ambiguous attitude to small nations adopted by the founders o f m arxism . 1 9 1 7 -1 9 2 3 , Penguin Books, 1966. P redom inant am ong the m any and som etim es co n trad icto ry views expressed by Marx and Engels on national size is their adm iration for large n ational u n its endow ed w ith genuine potentialities in respect of developm ent, m arket size, consistency, 'large-scale social p ro d u ctio n ', etc., and their general co n tem p t for small nations, w hich leads one to suppose th at how ever heatedly they defended the cause o f some th a t were labouring under the yoke of colonialism , they did so more from 'anticolonialism 'than for any other reason.
there was -a n d still has been in our own tim e16 -a tendency to extrapolate unblushingly in its support the undeniable qualities o f Athens or Florence or Weimar, i.e., o f small prenational cen tres, socially and culturally aristocratic, w hose history had unfolded when the world was in the p re developm ent stage and which were em bedded in cultural areas w hose con tin uity and kinship were substantial. With this kind o f special pleading and a little im agination the case is easy to defend, at least for a not over-strict ju d gem ent.17 Much more insidious than these argu ments on behalf o f minim um or m axi mum size is the solid system o f assump tions and associations on which their inspiration and even their strength o f conviction is based. This body o f suppo sitions -o r so at least we th in k -is more than capable o f effectively battering at any critical reflection on the national size claim ed to be appropriate: a capacity that is enhanced by the shortage, the com plex ity, the non-com parability and the scant quantifiability o f the empirical material accessible to a type o f thinking which aims at follow in g other paths.
T o put it more plainly, a smaller space and a smaller population are asso-16 A case in po in t is afforded by Mariano Picón Salas, " Las pequeñas naciones" (address delivered at the U niversity of P uerto Rico), in E uro p a -A m érica , Mexico City, Cuadernos A m e ricanos, 1947, pp. 199-225. 17 It has been contended, for exam ple, w ith respect to A thens, Florence and other centres in Italy and elsewhere, th a t small nations afford a life of m ore in terest and intensity. This is obviously true enough, in the case of cities professing a great love of peace and o f the universal values: a m atter in which they have n o t m uch choice, if they are n o t capable of externally pow erful ventures which represent possibilities of self-projection at the world level rather than, as m ight be alleged, a great deal of im itation and some degree of alienation, etc. In turn, it is principally w ith popula tion size that greater or lesser social diversification and integration are 18This suggestion, deriving largely from the recently-achieved G erm an 'Z o l l v e r e i n is plain to be seen in the R ío de la Plata co n tro versy of the 1860s respecting the 'patria g ra n d e' and the 'patria c h ic a ', and particularly in the allegations of Juan Carlos Gómez. associated, as well as dissension, uncon trollability and possibilities o f disinte gration; aptitude for proportional distri bution o f social costs; collective security and pride; volum e o f consum er demand; rigidity, inflexibility and difficulties in adapting to unexpected co n tin g en cies.19
A lthough nothing o f the sort could be done here and now , each o f these associations, after being checked and exem plified in many available statem ents o f opinion, w ould be w orth analysing in the light o f the empirical evidence, through research on its socio-cultural, traditional, philosophical, and som etim es even religious origins.
Possible appraisal criteria
Thus there are diverse theoretical stand points from which smallness o f national size can be appraised, And, w ithout aiming at an exhaustive classification, they may be presumed, until more accurate categories can be established, to be the following: 22 Svennilson, op. cit., , 1970, p. 141. 25 Simon K uznets, op. cit., pp. 27-31. 26 W ith respect to the consequences of the discovery o f petroleum , see L a tin A m e ric a n
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(E / CEPA L/981), Vol. I, pp. 14-15. While these observations will duly be taken into account for the purposes that concern us here, we shall opt for the more econom ical assumption that the follow ing considerations are focused upon the situation o f small nations, 
S o cia l change and social d e v e lo p m e n t p o lic y in L a tin
F eatures o f the 'sm all n ation s'
It is difficult, and theoretically perhaps im possible, to imagine any characteristic o f a small nation w hich originates simply and solely in the condition o f smallness, w hich is n ot in som e way made relative, m odified or inhibited by som e other condition or con d itions o f a different sort. O bviously, however, the incidence o f these latter is again not a question o f all-or-nothing but o f more-or-less, w hence it may legitim ately be deduced that there is a w hole set o f variables whose values and conform ations make them favourable or unfavourable to the 32 The first of these ceilings som ew hat exceeds the area of Paraguay, and the second is rath er higher than the population o f E cuador in 1970. T hus they cover the six Central American republics, the D om inican R epublic, Ecuador, Paraguay and U ruguay. A p o in t w orth stressing is th a t none of the rem aining L atin American countries falls below either of these tw o ceilings. In line w ith the usual practice, we have excluded the non-Spanish-speaking com m uni ties of the north ern zone of L atin America, and also Cuba, because o f its special situation. The problem of size in the first group has been studied by William G.
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R e fe re n c e to th e Caribbean, C hapter II, " U nderdevelopm ent and Self-sustained G row th in Small C ountries" , M ontreal, McGill Univer sity Press, 1965. needs o f a small national unit, and whose im portance will therefore be less depen dent on levels, comparative criteria, traditional factors or 'special situations'. Clearly, 'less' does n ot imply an absolute negation, but it could feasibly be proved that in each case such determ inants have to be very substantial in order to make any considerable difference to the plusor-minus effects o f size.
The follow ing is a tentative list o f those which seem to us m ost important. Only from th a t threshold upw ards will the coefficient o f correlation betw een m ark et size and incom e grow th be as low as 0. 49 It m ay be supposed th a t u n d er the influence o f w hat have been called here associa tions and suggestions originating in size, the o th er p o ten tial members will perhaps suspect th a t it is th e in itiato r of th e m ovem ent who will gain most. Of course, the experience of l a f t a and others o f the same kind could have settled th e question. weakened the degree o f control attain ab le.52 Even w ith ou t such distinguished testim ony, it is fairly obvious that the same capacity for repression or control -a s has been strikingly dem onstrated in a recent Latin American c a s e -becom es relatively more effective when it is exer ted over a numerically small population and within a space that has no very marked physical discontinuities. As can easily be seen, this possibility, like so many others, is a two-edged weapon, and, where success is achieved, efficacy is no guarantee whatever o f the direction in which this control will be exercised. 54 E tienne Balazs, in C ivilización china y burocracia, Buenos Aires, E ditorial Sur, 1966, p. 29-57, draws atten tio n to th e case o f an u n differentiated sub-continent, little suited to the form ation of nation-States.
León H om o, in E l Im p e rio R o m a n o ,
Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 1962, p. 238, points o u t the significance o f the 'diocese', betw een the 'p refecture', w hich was to o large, and the 'pro vince', which was too small, as an endeavour to represent th a t living 'regional elem ent' which was always lacking in the Rom an Empire. size is probably the variable which has m ost to do w ith this. Furthermore, within a very lim ited space it is more likely (although there are exam ples to the contrary, such as that o f Nicaragua and the rivalry betw een León and Mana gua) that tensions betw een a centre and certain local nuclei will be relatively weaker than they have usually been in more extensive national areas. o f this type the small com m unity may find its physical and social space daily eroded by abusive encroachm ents which will hardly necessitate formal State deci sions, and which include a virtually irrepressible contraband trade, the in fringem ent o f the country's airspace, and many other similar practices.
In addition, this vulnerability to ex ternal influences ultim ately affects the internal capacity for control; but, how ever m uch it does so, the tw o charac teristics in conjunction form a constella tion that bodes little good for the effectiveness o f the developm ent styles that a small nation may be in a position to ch oose or maintain.
(1) James Bryce, a British governm ent scientist, on the occasion o f a visit to Uruguay in 1910 spoke o f " nations constructed on a small scale" .60 But it is often their ill-luck that costs exist which are inseparable from the very existence o f a governm ent and a central adminis tration (for exam ple, expenditure on the foreign service) that have to be met up to a certain threshold irrespective o f the 'scale' on which the nation 'is construc ted', and that it m ust therefore cover or n o t be a nation-State. As an old axiom has it, large units are very costly and small ones just as much so, if the costs are com pared with the m uch more lim ited resources ou t o f which they have to be defrayed. This is borne out, despite all attenuating arguments, by defence expenditure;61 in the last few decades, however, it seem s to have becom e much more evident in the case o f scientific and technological equipm ent whose mini mum cost is far beyond the possibilities
See S o u th A m erica : O bservations a n d
Im p ressio n s, New YorJk, MacMillan, 1917, p. 351. 61 Simon K uznets, op. cit., p. 26. what would certainly be elem ents o f dissidence, on the other hand the society is deprived o f capital in the shape o f skills which at som e time, even if such a style prevails, it will probably need and will therefore have to seek at m uch higher costs.
(o) A wide differentiation o f roles, h ow ever, is not the only possible means o f achieving an integration w hose outcom e will be a very strong sense o f identity: this may also result from links which are not forged by com plem entarity. A more than average cohesion or h om ogeneity may be diagnosed as in the nature if not as the very essence o f smallness o f national size.67 From Plato to Rousseau -i t is worth w hile to r e ca ll-this charac teristic was a key elem ent in the prefer ence shown for small size in prenational com m unities. The objective im plicit in all the theses propounded during that phase is the existence o f com m on values, beliefs and sentim ents -e v e n o f that 'intim acy' which was guaranteed by the classical 'polis', and the loss o f which, it has been said, was the supreme political problem o f the expanded Rom e; even, indeed o f that 'concord' to w hose striking etym ological root attention has been called by Bertrand de Jou ven el.68 These would make feasible, in one way or another, the m aterialization o f the ideal o f self-governm ent and even the sim ple and straightforward forms o f 'direct dem ocracy'. Conversely, assuming that excellen ce in this particular respect is one o f the requisites for a stable political system , it has been argued that i f a political system cannot be extended for an indefinite period o f time, the 67 W.G. Deraas, op. cit., p. 91. 68 See Sheldon S. Wolin, P o litics a n d Vision, Boston, L ittle, Brown & Co., 1960, p. 72. reason is precisely that it is incapable o f winning, likewise for an indefinite period, solid and wholehearted support; therein lies the difference betw een the political system and the econom ic system, since the latter can be indefinitely exten ded because it is based on a pro ductivity which theoretically allows o f unlim ited grow th.69 In this way cohe sion and consensus are linked up with the them e o f small local and national units as 'cradles o f liberty', a point already touched on in passing; in terms o f the developm ent problem s that are o f concern here, there seem s to be no question that in such a political and social clim ate it is easier to secure the approval o f large sectors o f the popula tion for any style which needs to rely on popular su p p ort This applies n ot only at the level o f the indispensable changes and the shareable objectives, but also, in particular, at that o f the inevitable sacri fices which the project would entail and the groups and interests that would have to bear the brunt o f them. All this would likew ise involve a considerable dispersion and decentralization o f planning and decision-m aking mechanism s, which, although perhaps their coherence would n o t be strengthened, might find com pen sation for this loss in terms o f the support and contributions in which it would tend to be reflected.
The foregoing observations o f course im ply no opinion on the con ten t o f the stages and achievem ents that a small nation may attain in the adventure o f developm ent, a subject on which it seem s to o hazardous to generalize out side a very precise c o n te x t.70 But even in full awareness o f the risk o f idealiza tion that such a supposition may entail, 71 Sim on K uznets, op. cit., One o f these can be provisionally shelved: nam ely, an endeavour to de duce styles and m odels from the charac teristics o f the small Latin American nations. Its exclusion is due -pending a convincing re b u tta l-to our b elief that images, goals, power structures, are the really decisive elem ents in the determina tion o f styles; and this also means that sty le op tions are formulated prior to or at m ost correlatively with any considera tions relating to con text, viability and resources, w hich in any case lend them selves readily to adjustment, although n ot to the adoption o f decisions.
A realistic exercise, on the other hand, is an attem pt to pick out which features o f a small Latin American nation -u n d e rsto o d at the highest feasi ble and reasonable level o f ab stractionfacilitate or hamper, in terms o f co n tex t and resources, any type o f developm ent. And let us add that if " any type o f developm ent" is considered, these vari ables that infallibly have either favour able or unfavourable repercussions will n ot be very numerous; but presumably, in any event, however great the diversity o f styles may be, a very meagre quantum o f available resources, an extrem ely narrow national market or an acute vulnerability to foreign tra d e. will be capable o f affecting any developm ent that is som ething more than a mere label.
Finally, another practicable task, which will be attem pted here in relation to a single style, is a review o f the small-nation characteristics that may affect any one o f the styles identifiable.
The first exam ination we have set ourselves to undertake can be brief, especially if we refer to the ideas ex pressed above in each o f the eighteen paragrahps (a) to (r).
All the strictly econ om ic aspects covered in paragraphs (a) to ( It would seem obvious, for a start, that an extrem e policy o f productivity at any cost will n ot survive very long, at least in the quantitative terms that are usually worth while, if the set-up is one o f unavoidable shortage and under diversification o f resources. Such a situa tion may make it unrealistic to follow similar m odels adopted in m ilieus better fitted for them; and this lack o f realism may produce a wide range o f effects (adjustm ents, substitutions, a search for external or internal scapegoats, and even persistent integration efforts).
Meagre resources and a narrow mar ket may also offer little to attract mass inflow s o f foreign private investm ent, which, w ithout substantial incentives, m ight welt find the future ou tlook daun ting if the international image o f the developm ent style were very sombre and the existing level o f repression very high. All this would tend to carry weight, unless there were specific possibilities o f the area's integration w ith others that held ou t better promises; or again, unless certain special situations o f upheaval and insecurity -w h ic h should n ot be con sidered here-were to arise in neigh bouring nations, creating circumstances which, at least in hard times, are liable to transform a small and well-controlled area in to a haven o f no-loss-of-profit, or at least o f no-consequential-dam ages, to adapt the terms o f civil law. Save in these tw o exceptional eventualities, it is unlikely that the m ost generous legisla tion on investm ent o f foreign capital will accom plish more than an im provem ent o f the juridical and financial status o f foreign enterprises established in the country, which will thus obtain unlookedfor circumstantial profits. A nother point to add is that if the production effort is concentrated, as is highly probable, on exports and on the im provem ent o f the balance o f paym ents, the style will be rendered highly vulnerable to tw o such uncertain variables as the size o f the d om estic market and the nature o f the industrialization process. Furthermore, if an attem pt is made to provide an initial stim ulus to industrialization o f the type tried out elsewhere, the idle capacity required for im m ediate activation will alm ost certainly be lacking in the area. Emphasis on export activities and on the subordinate position o f consum ption may also com e to signify a process o f re-establishm ent o f 'enclaves' capable o f generating sharp differences betw een the privileged sectors and the rest, w ith the corresponding social repercussions.
All the foregoing considerations, ex cept for the proviso relating to foreign capital prospects, assume the small nation to exist in a vacuum. Probably, however, its aim is rather to operate as a 'm odel adscriptive' to another o f larger size, especially in such fields as the provi sion o f raw materials and redundant m anpower and even the acquisition o f energy, industrial products and more appropriate and cheaper technology than could be purchased elsewhere.
The constrictive style, like any other, will have to cope w ith the fact that the costs o f public administration are pro portionally higher for a small nation, but in all likelihood in a climate o f firm repression o f demand such outlays -e x c e p t for expenditure on security, which could always tend to increase in b oth absolute and relative te r m s-may, w ith inflation playing its part, be sub stantially restricted.
A bove the average, and even maxi mum, will be the potential for control and inflow o f inform ation com m on to small areas, and so will, in particular, the capacity for m anipulation that an autho ritarian system can attain in the external strategy o f a small com m unity. This is true b oth at the econom ic level -where these possibilities may feasibly be real iz e d -and in the political field. In the latter, however, there may conceivably be much less room for manoeuvre, at any rate during an initial stage and until the tim e has com e to move on to more pragmatic and less 'com m itted ' points o f view; which likewise means that during that first stage the inflexibility o f politi cal m anagem ent may be highly prejudi cial to the desired flexibility o f eco nom ic management.
With regard to the chances o f se curing able and active support from the population and o f creatively utilizing the latent potential for cohesion and inven tiveness which may be primarily charac teristic o f small units, it may reasonably be supposed th at the normally com pul sive nature o f the style and the very line it takes in social and ideological respects are not calculated to win the allegiance o f those age groups and sectors o f activity (you th , intelligentsia, techni cians) which are more inclined to give unstinted backing to an alternative orien tation o f a more consensual and harmo nizing character. However, the style does n ot call for much m obilization, but rather the contrary, a fact which tends to cancel out the adverse im plications o f the phenom enon; and, moreover, the latent dissension represented by external and conflictive loyalties (ideological, uni versal, continental) can perhaps be re pressed at little -o r at least little im m ediate-cost.
Within this general picture o f lack o f m obilization and scant recourse to inno vative possibilities, the fact that there is less differentiation o f roles in small countries will also be beneficial to a conservative style, especially as long and in so far as this low degree o f differentia tion is reflected p sychosocially in a range o f more m odest, conform able and rou tine aspirations. For those that do not merit these epithets, emigration will be an effective expedient that may only b ecom e dysfunctional when it drains the reserves and decim ates the cadres o f the m ost indispensable technical capacity; and also -o v e r the long te r m -when in addition to the cultural devastation that repression involves the average intellec tual level o f the com m unity has irreme diably deteriorated. But lucidity, a high standard o f inform ation and unrem itting self-determ ination on the part o f the citizenry are not among the goals o f the constrictive style, and the effects alluded to generally operate at a leisurely pace; the channels o f com m unication are slow to report them , and the m ost alarming messages either reach people who are not in a position to exert influence or even to obtain a hearing or, if they com e to the hands o f those w ho are, will certain ly be decoded in different ways.
The constrictive style also requires less capacity than any o f the other alternatives for autonom ous decision making w ithout reference to the powers that happen to be in the ascendant in the area, which means that external risks are greatly mitigated; and in everything that does not com e under this head, i.e., hostility on the part o f international public opinion, dangers latent in this, etc., the course usually tried will be that o f seeking international associations with other States whose attitude is similar. Such associations, besides still further blackening the external image o f the system , may be hopelessly sym bolical and represent very slight material advan tages.
Let us take note o f tw o other proba ble traits. In small, peaceful nations, where accordingly it may be assumed that for many generations the forces o f coercion have n ot waged international wars or -for obvious reasons o f s iz eundertaken tasks o f physical and social integration that others have perform ed, they will tend to lay persistent emphasis on their sym bolical value as custodians o f a decidedly rigid social order and o f a 'life sty le' and a national entity virtually inseparable from it. This claim will be highly consistent w ith the 'sacrocollective' character with which -as we s a id -the inevitable 'national doctrine' tends to be invested, and a substantial affinity will even be perceptible betw een that doctrine and the sectoral traditions and values o f the armed forces that so strongly influence the formal structure o f the subsystem o f coercion. Neverthe less, this ideological bias may com e into head-on collision with the secularlibertarian values im plicit in a neocapi talist econ om ic m odel, so that the tw o may do each other mutual harm, or, as is even more likely, may spoil theirchances o f being taken very seriously.
